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that because the interest comes in in a continuous stream of ripened products, "waiting" does not accurately describe the process, nor does it as well as the phrase "abstain from immediate consumption," but this abstinence is daily, continuous, and not performed once and for all when it is entered upon.

The other point has to do with the nature of land-rent. Professor Clark shows very clearly that in a static society there is no occasion for making any distinction between land and the other instruments of production. Many readers will doubtless infer from this that it is his opinion that the prominence until now given to the land question as distinct from the question of capitalistic production is unwarranted. Whether this is his view or not, he will, I am sure, be the first to concede that a study limited to economic statics furnishes too narrow a basis for such a conclusion. From the point of view of economic dynamics the fact that land is a gift of nature while other instruments of production are themselves products of human industry attaches to the former an interest which the latter are without. And this only testifies again to the value of the distinction between economic statics and economic dynamics to which the author consistently adheres. Both present theoretical problems, but only the latter, since it alone deals with the real world, concerns itself with practical questions.

In conclusion, it is not too much to say that the publication of Professor Clark's "Distribution" marks an epoch in the history of economic thought in the United States. Its inspiration, its illustrations, even its independence of the opinions of others, are American; but its originality, the brilliancy of its reasoning and its completeness deserve and will surely obtain for it a place in world literature.

HENRY R. SEAGER.

Droit Politique Contemporain: Par Vte. Combes de Lestrade. Pp. 732. Price, 12fr. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie., 1900.

A striking feature of this work is the confusion of thought which pervades it. The want of some central, governing principle is most pronounced. The results of this defect are almost disastrous, for law can be profitably studied only in connection with some fundamental conceptions, round which the great multitude of facts can be more or less systematically arranged. An enumeration of the main divisions of the work will be sufficient to enforce this truth upon the student of constitutional law. The book contains nine chapters, as follows: Nation—State, Social Composition, Constitutions and Governments, Sov-

ereign Power, Executive Power, Legislative Power, Forms of Government, Popular Suffrage, Constitutional Guarantees. Clearly then the author has given us here not a carefully analyzed presentation of the facts of constitutional law, but merely a series of essays without any necessary connection with each other.

Yet one fundamental idea pervades the essays, the idea namely, that political science must be based upon social science. M. de Lestrade belongs neither to the analytical nor to the historical school of jurisprudence, but to the new school (if it may be called such) which emphasizes the necessity of studying law (and everything else) from the point of view of certain ultimate social forces. The tendency of this thought is evidenced by the chapter on the social composition. There exists a social constitution which is tacit, flexible, unwritten, and in process of constant change. This constitution in turn rests upon certain inherent qualities in the human mind, and changes as these qualities change or manifest themselves in new ways. The political constitution, in the broad sense, is based upon the social constitution and should tend as nearly as may be to conform to it. The same idea underlies the chapter on "Constitutions and Governments." Anarchy cannot cease until some organization is established; this organization in its entirety is the constitution (p. 65). The narrower meanings of the term "constitution" are referred to, but they have little meaning for the author. "Government" is used interchangeably with "constitution." With government defined thus broadly, it is easy to see what becomes of the state; the state is merely an abstraction—the synthesis of collective interests as opposed to individual interests (p. 10). Just as the state fades away into a dim abstraction, so sovereignty is socialized into an unmeaning phrase. The sovereign is the arbiter between the social and the political constitution, and is the resultant of all the forces of society, material and immaterial; the sovereign is the nation (p. 224).

The merit of the work, therefore, consists in a constant emphasis of the fact that the political organization of any society is an outgrowth of the underlying social forces of the society—its ethnic, economic, sociological development—and, in a healthy society, tends to change with these forces. This is not a new idea, though, perhaps, it needs emphasis. One defect of the work consists in the assumption that the above fact necessitates the abandonment of all existing conceptions and definitions of political science itself. That political science rests upon social science may be admitted; but that the terminology and classifications of political science must, therefore, be ignored, does not follow. Definitions must be more or less arbitrary; their value for any science depends upon their convenience for purposes of discus-

sion and classification. To abandon an existing scientific classification without substituting a better one, simply because it is thought more emphasis should be placed upon certain basal facts of the science, is certainly unwise. It is true that every society politically organized has a constitution in the sense that it is constituted, but of what scientific value is the term constitution used in this sense? Why broaden out the term government until it has no precise meaning at all? Or, what legal value has the term sovereignty when defined as the author defines it? To say that sovereignty is the nation is simply to say that the nation is the nation, or that sovereignty is sovereignty, which is true enough, but of little value in legal discussion.

Nevertheless, there is much that is suggestive in the book, such as the author's defence of absolute government, his discussion of the various forms of minority representation, and the rather too attractive analogy he finds between the presidential system of the United States and the absolutism of Russia. Much, however, is puerile and inconsistent, as for instance, the statement that parliamentary government is the absence of government; that England has never had *ce que nous appelons* the parliamentary régime; that England has no political constitution, when political constitution has already been defined to mean political organization (p. 565). *Ce que nous appelons!* Let it be repeated, the fault lies there. Why not call it what everyone understands it to mean?

CARL BECKER.

State College, Pa.

Städteverwaltung im Römischen Kaiserreiche. By W. LIEBENAM.
Pp. xviii, 577. Price, 14*m.* Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1900.

In a striking passage of the introduction to his "Provinces of the Roman Empire," Mommsen says: "If an angel of the Lord were to strike the balance whether the domain ruled by Severus Antoninus was governed with the greater intelligence and the greater humanity at that time or in the present day, whether civilization and national prosperity generally have since that time advanced or retrograded, it is very doubtful whether the decision would prove in favor of the present." And it is in the townships, Mommsen holds, "that the work of the imperial period is to be sought and to be found." Evidently then, this critical and generally thorough, though concise, work of Liebenam on "Municipal Administration under the Empire" deserves more than a passing note; for it supplies a test of Mommsen's claim, and also reveals the later deterioration of municipal life.